Towards a
New Paradigm in International Relations – The Contribution of the
European Political Co-operation in the Times of the Yugoslav Crisis
by
Anca Păduraru
Graduate, The Electrical
Engineering Faculty at The Polytechnic Institute “Traian Vuia” of
Timisoara, Romania
____________________
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the
Master of Arts in European Integration
in the
College of Humanities,
University of Limerick,
1993
1993
Dr. Nicholas Rees
______________
Dissertation Supervisor
Table of
Contents
Introduction
Chapter I: The Principle of
Self-Determination
- The Taming of the Principle
- The Reasons for a Domesticated Principle
- Qualified Secession and the European Political Co-operation
Chapter II: The Principle of State
Formation and Recognition
- Recognition of States, Between Redundancy and Non-Endorsement
- Why Non-Endorsement Was Ruled Out
- Recognition as a State Founding Principle and the European Political Co-operation
Chapter III: The Principle of
Non-Intervention
- Non-Intervention as a State Supportive Principle
- States' New Foe: Humanitarian Intervention
- Qualified Intervention and the European Political Co-operation
Conclusion
References
Acknowledgments
I thank all my teachers at the
University of Limerick, Department for European Integration and
Administration, for their effort to pass their knowledge to me.
If the latter will not be
discernible in the following pages, it is obviously no body's fault
but mine.
Anca Păduraru
Abbreviations
CDU/CSU Christian Democratic
Union/Christian Social Union
CSCE Conference for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
EC European Community
EEC European Economic Community
EP European Parliament
EPC European Political Co-operation
EPP European People's Party
IGO Intergovernmental Organization
NATO North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
UN United Nations
US United States
USA United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
WEU Western European Union
Introduction
This dissertation is an attempt to
assess the advantages and disadvantages of the European Political
Co-operation (EPC) process. The study focuses on the case of the
Yugoslav crisis and looks at the role that the European Community
(EC) has and is playing in this crisis. Furthermore, the way the
international community is dealing with the conflict in Yugoslavia is
regarded as relevant for exposing the changes that are taking place
in the international relations paradigm, where the right of peoples
to statehood is increasingly challenged by a new interpretation given
to the principles founding the present world system as a states'
system.
The EC has changed its position
concerning Yugoslavia from non-intervention to seeking to promote
stability, and from the promotion of peace (while proving actor
capability) to the imposition of its own idea of conflict resolution
(Wiberg, 1992: 30). Furthermore, its changes in attitude cannot be
regarded as simple responses to the developments in Yugoslavia, since
the very stances of the Community were among the causes triggering
these outcomes.
The crucial thing, though, is that
while Yugoslavia and the EC look important – like actors do when in
the limelight – the lines in the play are fundamentally changing.
The existing normative framework of the states' system founded on the
interlocking of the principles of self-determination, state formation
and recognition and the non-intervention norm, is shifting towards a
new framework that qualifies the secessionist self-determination and
the outside intervention. If these developments could only be guessed
during the Gulf War, the events in Somalia and Yugoslavia were, each
in their turn, a springboard for the new principles. Whether indeed
they will ascend to the status of founding principles of the
international order, then important changes will be underway: at one
end stays the world system completely unstructured as a states'
system; at the other end stays the world system completely integrated
in a state led by the United Nations. In-between is the continuation
of the policy of “might is right” by the world, regional or local
powers, not in the name of democracy this time – be it communist or
capitalist –, but in the name of the human rights.
Whether we welcome this as the eve of a
new world order, or we loathe it for the same reason, the fact is
that important alterations are taking place in the international
relations paradigm.
The
dissertation is organized in the chronological order of these three
previously interlocking principles' implementation on the Yugoslav
case. Each chapter will comprise a short presentation of the
existing “former” principle, considered relevant for the point
being made, and the actual developments of the principle in the EPC
process. This is not to say that the EPC was shaping – either the
events on the ground, or the new paradigm in international relations
–, but that it was as much acting as reacting, being just one of
the inputs, and just one of the refiners in this whole phenomenon.
The first chapter gives a brief account
on the spawning of the principle of self-determination as a
destructive principle of the world order of the 19th
Century, on the way it still preserved its disruptive meaning on the
eve of the Second World War, and the subsequent emasculation of the
principle enshrined in the legislation passed by the United Nations
(UN). Furthermore, there are given the reasons – legal and
political – that prevented the self-determination (and the implied
secession) to be in the high esteem of both the United Nations
Organization (UNO) and of its member states. The chapter ends with
the example offered by the dissolution of Yugoslavia and its
endorsement by the European Community, valued as a real breakthrough
in the international praxis.
The second chapter deals with the norm
of state formation and recognition, at first from a historical
perspective, explaining what its status was in the international
relations up to the Yugoslav crisis. The fact that the recognition of
the breakaway Yugoslav republics functioned as a factor constitutive
of statehood is seen as another turning point in the existing
framework of the international relations. In what concerns the
developments in the European Community, this is also relevant for the
way Germany displays a growing boldness in its foreign policy, under
the Community's umbrella.
Chapter three is focused on the
principle of non-intervention which stays at the basis of the present
world system as a states' system, together with the other relevant
principles like sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
non-interference in the domestic affairs of a state. It stresses
that, while after 1945 the right of humanitarian intervention –
which previously existed – has been expelled from the principles of
international order, in the present day international praxis,
it is surfacing again. It is enshrined in pieces of legislation
passed by the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly, and it
is heavily re-enforced by the European Community with its economic,
political, and military pressure. Finally, the consequences on the
European Political Co-operation are valued as positive, the
protracted conflict in Yugoslavia working as a catharsis for a common
stance of the Community. Furthermore, the West European Union (WEU)
has grown in its assertiveness, both as a defense component for the
Community and as an European pillar for the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). This happened as a consequence of its becoming
operational and participating, together with NATO, to the enforcement
of the UN ordered embargo on Yugoslavia.
In the Conclusion it is argued on what
would bring the present developments in the international relations
paradigm, as discernible during the Yugoslav crisis. Since the
secessionist self-determination and the humanitarian intervention are
not to be applied consistently on a world scale, but only outside the
Western world, their endorsement by the Third World and Non-Aligned
countries as superseding principles of international relations is
unlikely. Furthermore, United Nations puts its own status as a
states' organization in jeopardy, by its active involvement in the
development of these two principles. Therefore, we should either get
our double standards right in connection with these two principles,
or not use them at all. As it is, it looks reasonable to assume that
the right of the minority as opposed to that of the state would be
the ideology of the future in the name of which economic and
political pressure, and outside military intervention would be moral
deeds.
The dissertation draws on the data
published by the Office for the Official Publications of the European
Communities, on the publications of the Agence Internationale
d'Information pour la Presse, and from a number of secondary sources
such as the books and articles on the topic. The tape-recording of
the lecture given on the situation on the ground in Yugoslavia by
Commandant Colm Doyle, Irish officer in the UN forces, and personal
representative of Lord Carrington for Bosnia Herzegovina, is the only
source used that is not yet published.
The number of academic papers, articles
and news reports written on the Yugoslav crisis is impressive, but
much of this is emotional analysis, and very little is of long term
value. The emotional appeal on behalf of the victims of war crimes,
the depicting of an aggressor portrayed in evil features, the
recourse to “lessons” from history, the pointing to nationalism
as primitive, the outrage for the existence of a conflict at the
heart of Europe, all do nothing but help us loosing focus.
Wars have always been appalling. When
going to war one has to simplify through propaganda the complex
reality into “good and bad”, “right and wrong”, for practical
reasons of making acceptable to the public opinion the political
decisions and the subsequent loss of young life. As for nationalism
being a primitive feeling, nothing more false than that: it was a
19th Century invention in the realm of political ideas,
and it means just the organization of a state along national lines.
As Dunn (1987: 45) puts it, “nationalism in and of itself is
neither good nor bad. At times it can be democratic or undemocratic,
fanatical or moderate, productive or destructive. The only thing that
nationalists hold in common is the belief that nations have a right
to determine their own destinies.” As for the ethnic conflict in
springing out of the perceived differences in ethnicity, it will be
equivalent with saying that inter-state conflicts stem from the very
existence of different states. And finally, quoting examples from
history is an unsound intellectual exercise when theorizing because,
firstly, history is not a list of facts, but of facts as reported by
people, and secondly, its record is too long to not comprise
everything one would like, enabling one to prove or disprove anything
in the world.
The only valid argument of those listed
previously is that Yugoslavia is significant and a problem to be
examined because the Yugoslav conflict is indeed at the geographical
heart of Europe, and also because it tells us something about the
role of the EPC in
conflict resolution. This only accelerated the changes of approach –
or better say challenges – towards the very foundation of the
international system as a states' system.
Chapter I
The
Principle of Self-Determination
1. The Taming of the Principle
As it emerged in the 19th
and early 20th Centuries, the principle of national
self-determination was a very explosive one, aiming the
self-assertion against any form of domination1.
But its subsequent evolution showed that while it had been put
nominally at the foundation of the international relations, its
implementation had been linked with that of other relevant
principles, and its actual meaning had been adapted for the purposes
of a stable states' order as the world order.
In the time of the League of Nations,
the regime for the protection of minorities included seven stages, of
which, however, the last was not an automatic one. This meant that
the initial petition of an individual belonging to a minority who
felt his/her rights were not being respected by the respective
government (stage 1), was not risen automatically during a formal
League session (stage 7), unless a member of the Council decided so,
and thus rendered the complain “public” for the first time. Both
minorities and governments subjected to scrutiny for minorities
rights were unhappy with this system. Also, the way World War II
broke out taught us that “Germany, whilst a keen champion of
minority rights, adhered to this principle, not out of commitment to
the international protection of minorities, but because of affective
links with specific German minorities in specific states. Indeed,
under Hitler, it became clear that Germany was fundamentally opposed
to the assumption that German minorities should live under “foreign”
governments and undermined the League system by encouraging German
minorities to act in a disloyal and provocative manner” (Claude, as
cited in Ryan, 1990: 157).
Thus, the world's structure, as it
emerged after World War II, was that of a community of states, and
not of peoples. Nation came to mean state, and the very issue of
national self-determination was tamed on the one hand by the
simultaneous applicability of the norms of non-intervention and
preservation of the territorial integrity of states, and on the other
hand by the right to exercise the self-determination only once.
Though it acquired the status of jus
cogens, the principle was void of its earlier disruptive
meanings, for it was not the right of a nation, but the right of a
colony to independence or union with another state, and the right of
a majority within a colony or a state. The basis was now territorial,
instead of ethnic or cultural. It applied to non-self-governing
territories, not to metropolitan territories. It meant
non-colonialism and in practice came to mean only independence from
Western colonial rule. The only other beneficiaries of such a right
were territories under occupation and majorities subjected to
institutionalized racism (Heraclides, 1991: 21).
As it is now, only very few states
regard the right of secession as inherent in the right of
self-determination (Somalia, India's recognition of Bangladesh in
1971, the four African recognitions of Biafra in 1971, and the four
African recognitions of Biafra, in 1988), and the state-centric view
of the world held by the world's governments is mirrored in the way
United Nations operates (Ibidem)2.
Why the world system evolved in such a
way that it protected states against national minorities and not the
other way around, it is obvious: there are very few states that do
not comprise on their territory minority groups. The United Nations,
the various Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) and the states'
governments had to narrow the meaning of self-determination, or else
they would have put themselves at peril, while inviting or justifying
attacks on the integrity and unity of one of their own kin. (It
should be noted, however, that this argument goes only for the legal
point of view. Since the end of World War II, history counted
numerous attempts to secession and outside intervention in the name
of national self-determination.)
- The Reasons for a Domesticated Principle
The strict legal arguments for not
encouraging secession lay, therefore, (1) on the right to exercise
self-determination only once, on the basis of pacta sunt servanda;
(2) on the international law as the law of states, and not
individuals or peoples (states are the subject of international
relations, and the peoples – majorities and minorities – are the
objects of law); (3) on the argument of mutuality (as states cannot
oust one of their provinces, equally a province cannot secede). As
Lee C. Buchheit (in Heraclides, 1991: 28) further summarizes, the
political, non-legal arguments speaking against secession were: (1)
the fear of Balkanization, the domino theory, or the Pandora box; (2)
the fear of indefinite divisibility, because very few states are
ethnically homogeneous, and often neither are the secessionist
territories themselves; (3) the fear of the effect such a right could
have on the democratic system, by providing a minority with an
opportunity for constant blackmail – threatening to secede if there
is no conformity with its wishes; (4) the danger of giving birth to
non-viable and particularly small entities which would rely on
extensive international aid; (5) the fear of trapped minorities
within the seceding state, who presumably cannot secede in their
turn; (6) the fear of “stranded majorities” in cases where the
seceding territory is economically or strategically crucial to the
original state.
Since the principle of
self-determination was not only watered down, but even in its diluted
form it lost the object of its application – being used for only
such cases as the Palestinians and the South African blacks – it
would have become a non-entity, equivalent with the principles of
non-intervention or sovereignty, were it not for the changes caused
by the end of the Cold War.
It seems realistic to presume that the
future will not bring the end of separatism, but again an enforcement
of double standards regarding the re-animated principle of
self-determination. It was not “right” to deny self-determination
for a distinguishable minority that happened to be part of an already
independent state at the time of the drafting of the United Nations
Charter. But as it is now applied, it is again being used in the
territories outside the former metropolitan states!
The principle cannot become any better,
for the very defining of terms (nation, national minority) is as
difficult and culturally biased now, as it was half a century or a
century ago. And indeed, which population is entitled to
self-determination: the one living in Northern Ireland, the one
living in the island of Ireland, the population of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, or the latter plus that of the
Republic of Ireland? But, this is a pointless question, since the
principle is designed today, as it was before, to re-shape the world
outside the Club of the Western World. The “new” principle is
only dressed up in the white clothes of a “better” world, whereas
its foundations are morally suspect and intellectually unsound.
Some – like Franklin (1992: 38) –
try to sort the problem by designing “additional rules for
secession” like (1) a “historical identity” for the seceding
area; (2) financial or other compensation to be negotiated for the
assets and future revenues forgone by the country being seceding
from; (3) agreement in new treaties for special needs and demands
like access to ports or renunciation of nuclear weapons. As the
author himself points out, all his “new criteria” are
questionable and therefore he ends with the unhappy conclusion that
“the situation in Eastern Europe and ex-Soviet Union is unusually
messy. In response, foreign diplomacy will have to be flexible,
creative, quick off the mark, sometimes thrusting, sometimes
restrained” (Ibid: 40). He continues that “the formula sounds
rather like the recipe for a successful service industry (the
“industry” of re-drawing the borders in these areas3),
which sadly, over the next few years is going to be a growth industry
(Ibidem). One can take this last remark only as his apology for
writing the article quoted.
- Qualified Secession and the European Political Co-operation
In the case of Yugoslavia, the calls
for the right of self-determination for the peoples within it are
completely out of the tune it had been set at the end of World War
II. None of the United Nations criteria for defining the principle
are applicable to the Yugoslav case. The crucial issue was, as in the
question Yugoslavia sent to the Badinter Commission4:
“Who can be subject of the right to self-determination from the
standpoint of the international pubic law – a nation or a federal
unit; is the right to self-determination a subjective collective
right or the right of a territory?”
“The Badinter Commission reply
avoided a clear answer. When political and national boundaries
differ, the interpretation of national self-determination is rather
difficult, as seen when the Badinter Commission implicitly treated
the republics as the relevant entities, whereas the Serbs outside
Serbia as minorities or ethnic group, rather than as nations”
(Wiberg, 1992: 39). This blew wind in the Croatian sails, since in
reply to the Arbitration Commission of the Conference in The Hague,
which raised the question whether the Serbs in Croatia “as
constituent people of Yugoslavia” are entitled to
self-determination, Croatia affirmed that “the rights of every
national group or minority must be guaranteed in every republic or
state”, but that these minorities “do not have the right to
secede”. In its message to the Badinter Commission, Croatia
denounced the creation of “so-called” regions or autonomous
Serbian republics on its territory as “illegal”.5
As Wiberg (in print: 108) stresses,
EC's answer reflected its state emphasis, inventing the principle
that secessions should follow administrative rather than
ethnic-national boundaries.
The first consequence was that outside
the newly independent states were left two million Serbs in Croatia
and Bosnia Herzegovina, 750,000 Croats in Bosnia Herzegovina, and two
million Albanians in present Yugoslavia and Macedonia. (He further
highlights that the German Rechtstaatlichkeit was embodied in
the criteria for recognition, especially human rights and minority
protection, attempting to make it irrelevant that political and
national boundaries differ and that international law distinguishes
“nations”, entitled to self-determination, from “national
minorities”, merely entitled to minority protection.)
The second consequence, stemming from
the first, was that the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina saw
themselves reduced in their status from a founding people of the
former Yugoslavia to a national minority in the two newly created
states. Therefore they tried to pursue the same national
self-determination, and to secede in their turn, thus providing a
perfect illustration of the consequences following secession as
described by Buchheit, and cited previously.
Through the endorsement of the right to
secession of Croatia and Slovenia, the EC did nothing but open the
Pandora box, provoked further divisibility, and since the Serb
entities in Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina could not be viable in
themselves this triggered the “ethnic cleansing” and the military
operations with the aim of providing these entities with
link-corridors with Serbia. The same stays true for the Croats in
Bosnia Herzegovina, as the latest developments (May-June 1993) are
showing.
However, the most important consequence
is not for the fate of Yugoslavia as a federal state, or for that of
its peoples trapped in this turmoil, but for the legal basis of the
international system as a states' system. The fact that the challenge
of the world order is actually taking place shows something we
already knew: that the equilibrium provided by the superpower balance
of powers has been disrupted. Whereas the fact that among the
challengers is the EC, is a sign of its growing assertiveness on the
international arena. That this is happening with Germany as the
driving motor is only natural, since Germany is the driving economy.
Unnatural was its low profile up to now!
Chapter II
State
Formation and Recognition
1. Recognition of States – Between
Redundancy and Non-endorsement
As opposed to the norm valid at the
beginning of this century, in the last 45 years, the recognition of
states was not anymore a factor constitutive of statehood, as it was
not the membership in the United Nations Organization. In other
words, if there was actual control over the territory and its
inhabitants by an organized government, and it appeared to be likely
to be so in the future, the state was regarded as existing and was
recognized on that basis. Other states put themselves at risk legally
if they chose to ignore the basic obligations of state relations.
Though recognition does not imply in itself any approval, some
states, including the United States, used sometimes non-recognition
as a way of expressing disapproval.
However, as Heraclides (1991: 25)
points out, recognition of an entity by third states has always been
an important issue concerning secessions stricto sensu (those
with a declaration of independence). An entity that bears the marks
of statehood but it is not a self-determined unit, such as Katanga
and Biafra in the 1960s, and the Republic of Northern Cyprus today,
cannot be recognized by third states. Any such recognition defies the
principle of self-determination of the majority in a state and is
regarded at very least as premature, hence an unwarrantable
intervention in the internal affairs of another state. On the other
hand, if an entity is a self-determination unit, but does not meet
the strict criteria of statehood, such as Algeria in the late 1950s,
the former Portuguese colonies in Africa and, more recently, and
controversially, the Sahraoui Arab Democratic Republic, there is far
greater leniency, and third states may recognize such entities
without being regarded as patently intervening in the internal
affairs of another state.
In any case, as Wiberg (1992: 40)
reminds us, international praxis has been not to recognize unilateral
secessions, unless and until the seceding units appear to have
permanent and stable control over (most of) the territory they claim
as theirs, whether by agreement with the state they secede from or by
clearly demonstrating it de facto. After the failed coup in
Moscow in August 1991, there was a clear break with this tradition:
many Western states instantly recognizing several ex-USSR states
proclaiming independence.
- Why Non-endorsement Was Ruled Out
The recognition of a seceding territory
emerging as a norm constitutive of statehood in international
relations will not bring with it the actual existence of a state, but
just another means for exercising outside pressure on a given state,
and ultimately on the international system, as one consisting still
of sovereign states. It will be an element with a twofold
potentiality: integrating and disintegrating the world system. But
for practical reasons, first comes disintegration. The shaping of the world
on ideological grounds, in itself, it is
neither better nor worse than before. The ideology only it's new.
- Recognition as a State Founding Principle and the European Political Co-operation
Looking now at the way the recognition
of the breakaway Yugoslav republics emerged, it will be obvious how
the Community's stance changed completely, following the four steps
sequence described in the introduction – from non-intervention and
support for Yugoslavia as a single political entity, to complete,
biased and active involvement in its dismemberment.
The attitude towards the political
future of Yugoslavia developed in the EPC process can be best
described by the declaration on the situation in Yugoslavia adopted
on 4 February 1991 by the EEC Foreign Ministers, pleading against the
use of force and, at the same time, for the unity and territorial
integrity of the country. Asked about the appeal for unity and
territorial integrity, Council President Jacques Poos said at his
press conference that “the Community has no interest in a
dismantling of Yugoslavia”6.
The same position was valid on the eve of the European Council in
Luxembourg, on 27 June 1991, when the President of the European
Parliament (EP) Enrique Baron, after speaking to the Heads of State
and Government of the Community, at the opening of the Council,
recalled the press the very firm resolution of the European
Parliament, which confirmed Parliament's preference for a united and
federal Yugoslavia, in the respect of democracy and human rights.7
But still waters ran deep, and one got signs of the tides to come
when the European Parliament rejected point by point a draft
resolution by the EPP, Socialists, Liberals, Conservatives, Unitarian
Left, Greens and the Rainbow Group, asking the Twelve to recognize
Croatia and Slovenia “if the cease-fire and the separation of the
belligerent forces had produced no effect by Monday 14 October”. It
did so following the withdrawal of the signature of the Socialists
and the Unitarian Left from this text, justified by the fact that the
Council had asked for greater flexibility in its mediation work.8
However, the developments occurring by
the European Council in December 1991, will show that Germany did
exactly what it should have “more than ever avoided to” -
according to the spokesman for policy for the CDU/CSU parliamentary
group in Germany Karl Lamers: it took the stance of “a lone ranger
in its foreign policy”. As Lamers put it, “the threat of
recognition by the EEC as a whole could have been effective at the
beginning of the conflict, but that it is of no use now”.9
The actual attitudes on the recognition
issue in the EPC process at Maastricht is very interesting and need
to be looked at closely: during the meeting on political
co-operation, under the presidency of Hans Van den Broek, the EEC
Foreign Ministers reached a consensus on the Franco-German proposal
for a “doctrine” of recognition by the Community Member States of
new states that could arise in Europe10,
but they did not agree on the terms of implementation. The Belgian
minister, Mark Eyskens, described the middle road as consisting in
the “recognition of the irreversibility of the principle of
recognition”, or in an agreement on the principle of recognition,
with diplomatic implementation being delayed.11
As for the timing, Hans-Dietrich
Genscher, the German Foreign minister, proposed that recognition take
place “within 24 hours”; the Dutch Presidency was for 15 January;
the Danes, supported afterward by the Belgians and the Germans, stood
by 23 December, while Luxembourg was for returning the question to
the General Affairs Council of 3 February, to give UN's mission a
chance for succeeding.12
And this is precisely what did not
happen, rendering the agreement reached upon, and the work of the
Badinter Commission purposeless, since Germany started “from the
view that the Republics of Croatia and Slovenia fulfill the
conditions on the list of principles and the prerequisites for
recognition”13,
and recognized the two republics on 23 December 1991, completely out
of the scenario agreed upon. Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign
minister, summarized perfectly the situation: “The Bonn Government
will not be able to postpone the recognition after 15 January.
Germany does not feel bound by the agreement on conditional
recognition and can … opt out”14.
The agreement of which Germany “opted
out” was that:
- the Arbitration Commission chaired by Robert Badinter in the framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague should then verify that these republics are satisfying the conditions imposed by the Twelve;
- on the basis of this opinion, the Twelve will decide whether or not to recognize them on 15 January.
The argument for the recognition of the
seceding republics was first presented as a political leverage, a
threat, targeting the federal government of Yugoslavia. Afterward it
became a “necessity” to “stop the killing”, and it went
unabated – in the cases of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina
– till it reached the question of recognizing the former Republic
of Macedonia. Here the EC went into problems, as the Greeks have very
strong feelings against it, and have hidden their anxieties behind
the arguments over the republic's future name.
The important thing for our
understanding is that exactly within the debate on this issue of
recognitions are exposed all the weaknesses of the EPC process, with
its inevitable temporizing given by the inter-governmental procedure,
and the necessity to accommodate different national perspectives.
Germany threw in its whole political
weight and got in the end what it wanted, with the endorsement of the
EC. As Nuttall (1992: 319) warned, the lack of long term common
foreign policies raises the risk of the EPC to give birth to
something that is nothing else but national policies writ large. And
he further notes that “there is a danger in this approach. Put at
its crudest, it makes it easier for a Member State to adopt one
policy collectively at the European level and follow another one
nationally, possibly incompatible with the first. This is perceived
as an advantage by some Member States. It is most likely to happen
when the choice is between a moral and a realpolitik approach
to a question, particularly one involving human rights. Moral
attitudes can be struck at the European level, under the cover of
which more self-interested policies can be pursued nationally. This
is the exculpatory function of the political co-operation which is of
advantage neither to the pragmatist, nor to the unionist, but to the
cynic,” (Ibid: 319).
The good thing, however, is that
Yugoslavia provided the “necessary amount of crisis”17
to make evident that in spite of the principles of complete
separation of competence and respective procedures of political
co-operation inside the EC, the facts called for permanent and
inevitable interaction between the political and economic sides in
the foreign relations, as de Schoutheete (1980: 173) pointed out a
good many years ago. In this respect, the withdrawal of the carrot
(the promised aid, the annulment of the signed agreements), and the
use of the stick (the economic embargo) were as much economic as
political deeds – the line in-between being blurred.
Ultimately, from a West European
perspective, it turned out for the better. For the aim of an ever
closer coming together of the Member States, that the German view
prevailed it was the good thing to happen; our assessment changes
according to how we place ourselves for observing the “details”.
The outside view gives the image of the EC as a growing actor. The
inside view shows that Germany is the one that grows. This is
highlighted by the hasty recognition which Germany gave to Croatia
and Slovenia, on 23 December 1991, disregarding the very principles
it set as a precondition for recognition. The way the other Member
States “joined in” on the 15 January 1992 is another sign of the
links becoming tighter and tighter between the Twelve, or, perhaps,
“One plus Eleven”, according to mathematics – and not only
mathematics.
Chapter
III
The
Principle of Non-Intervention
- Non-Intervention as a State Supportive Principle
Though a right of humanitarian
intervention had existed before 1945, the traditional legal position
in the aftermath of World War II was that non-intervention was a
fundamental norm, and however praiseworthy the motives, military
intervention was an infringement of prohibition of force, as set in
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
Deviation from this norm could be based
on powers conferred by the UN Charter to collective intervention, and
following specific resolutions, for such reasons as provided under
Chapter VII of the UN Chapter. Chapter VII gives the UN Security
Council the power to take action, including military action, if there
is “a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of
aggression”18.
However, this is not at odds with Article 2(7) of the Charter, which
states that “nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state”, since Article 2(7) itself
provides that it does not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.
As Greenwood (1993) suggests, while
those that opposed collective intervention invoked Article 2(7) of
the Charter, those that supported United Nations intervention did so
because they opposed unilateral intervention, thinking there was more
scope for abuse. Unilateral intervention could be derived only from
customary international law, but states' practice revealed little
support for the existence of such a right, and rested their case
primarily on the right of self-defense. India's intervention in East
Bengal, in 1971, Tanzania's overthrow of the Amin government in
Uganda, in 1979, Vietnam's use of force against the Pol Pot regime,
in Cambodia, are cases in point. More recently, the International
Court of Justice took the same view, when it rejected that the United
States intervention in Nicaragua could be justified by the violations
of human rights of the Nicaraguan government.
Again, as Heraclides (1991: 26) points
out, traditionally, non-intervention means non-interference against a
state and not non-intervention in its support. A sovereign
independent state is entitled to request from any third state the aid
that it deems necessary. At the same time, third states cannot assist
secessionists19,
for they would be in effect using force against the territorial
integrity of an independent state.
- States' New Foe: Humanitarian Intervention
The above situation, however, has
characterized the former Yugoslavia. At first, the conflict was
perceived as within the federal state, therefore intervention was not
envisaged, only afterward was it justified on humanitarian grounds.
After the seceding republics received international recognition and
became states in their own right, the conflict became an
international one, which meant that the regular legal instruments
used for regulating relations between states could again be used.
From that moment, at least, the legal basis for outside intervention
no longer needed to rest upon any theory of humanitarian
intervention, for the case was described not as lawful military
action of a sovereign state government to prevent the dismemberment
of the country, but as a case of international aggression, of a state
against another state, similar to that of Iraq’s attack on Kuwait.
Therefore the UN Security Council was again able to adopt measures
under Chapter VII of the Charter with regard to Yugoslavia.
Not the same scenario applied for the
“second generation” secessions!
For the Serbs within the newly formed
states of Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina, and the Albanians in
Kosovo, the right to self-determination and subsequent secession was
not recognized, and since the conflict within these states20
was defined as an internal one, again there was made recourse to the
right for humanitarian intervention. But, ironically, this time to
keep these states from further dismemberment.
The concept of humanitarian
intervention evolved so rapidly, that it is almost obsolete to quote
Heraclides (1991: 56) when stating that “most relief agencies take
the view (at least officially) that their aid – when administered
to secessionist held territory – is purely humanitarian and not
political. But as one researcher of humanitarian intervention put it,
somewhat bluntly, such distinction is propaganda”21.
The quotation is futile as the means
used today are more straightforward, and the international legal
framework has changed at a pace with the evolution of the political
stances. A short review of the relevant Resolutions passed by the UN
Security Council illustrates how Yugoslavia's dissolution was
enshrined in pieces of legislation.
In September 1991, UN Security Council Resolution 713 estimated that
“the continuation of fighting in Yugoslavia constituted a threat to
international peace and security”, and imposed an arms embargo
under Chapter VII. The Resolution was adopted with the approval of
the Yugoslav government, thus fully respecting the sovereignty of
this state.
Resolution 721, opening the way for the establishment of a
peace-keeping force in Croatia, had been requested by the government
of Yugoslavia.
Resolution 743, establishing the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), no
longer referred to the consent of the government of Yugoslavia, was
based on Chapter VII, but the force was deployed with the consent of
all parties.
May 1992: Resolution 752, demanding an end to the fighting in Bosnia,
refers to “the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”.
August 1992: UN Security Council adopted by 12 votes in favor, and
abstentions from China, India and Zimbabwe, Resolution 770, inviting
United Nations members to take “all necessary measures22”
for humanitarian aid to reach Bosnia Herzegovina.
The last Resolution states that this
should be done “in co-ordination with the United Nations”, but
outside the UNPROFOR. In Rome, experts from the WEU Foreign and
Defense Ministries considered on the same day that “the idea of
creating humanitarian corridors to get aid to Bosnia was outside an
immediately achievable framework”. However, they decided to
evaluate the idea of organizing “escorted convoys” by troops23.
Resolution 770 is proof that the UN
Security Council has now the power24,
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to take military action against
the present Yugoslavia, or authorize a group of states or ad hoc
coalition to take military action against it, as it did in the case
of Kuwait. Only political and military considerations prevented the
actual action to be taken, and not the legal ones. As Gow (1992)
said, when using coercion, one has to balance the comfort one gets
from curbing the will of others, with the discomfort of the costs
implied to oneself in the respective action. And if benefits do not
sensibly outweigh losses, there is no room for making domestic public
opinions take the burden of stiff body-bags coming back home.
A quick list of the apprehensions and
the dilemmas facing politicians when contemplating military
involvement in Yugoslavia, as given by Dewar (1993), comprises: the
uncontrolled immigration westwards because of the fighting; the
multitude of local militias with incomplete control over their men,
which could be “pacified” only at very high costs for the forces
of intervention; the terrain, which favors the defensive; the high
costs of imposing a political settlement, or propping up a puppet
government once a victory had been achieved. Of course, there are
also some discomforts with humanitarian flavor, that there is no such
thing as a “surgical air strike”, or that the UN peace-keeping
forces would be displaced once the full-fledged military operations
began, and thus the aid to the suffering and survivors would be
disrupted.
Furthermore, there is certain problem
in the attempt to dress the old political goals with the new
“humanitarian” sauce, and then sell them to the military staff.
As a consequence, further delay of the intervention occurred, for a
conflict emerged between the political and military class. The
military men want the political goals to be spelled out clearly when
going to war, and even more so when commanding others to go. No
wonder one can read General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the US Joint
Chiefs of Staff, stating that “military force is not always the
right answer. If force is used imprecisely or out of frustration
rather than clear analysis, the situation can be made worse. Decisive
means and results are always to be preferred, even if not always
possible. So, you bet I get nervous when so-called experts suggest
that all we need is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack.
When the desired result isn't obtained, a new set of experts comes
forward with talk of a little escalation” (Powell, 1992).
Turning our attention now back to the
swift expansion of United Nations' activities in the realm of
peace-keeping, peace-making, and peace enforcement, one has to note
that the change had been caused by the fundamental turn in the policy
performed by the former USSR. As a result of its domestic
developments, the conflictual approach was changed for a close
collaboration between Russia and the United States. This affected the
stature of the UN Security Council, which turned from a potentially
dead body, hampered in its initiatives by the incessant use of vetoes
by the two great powers, into a very active and self-assertive body.
Some would say too active, and too self-assertive, for example in
response to the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait, when for the first time
since the Korean crisis in 1950, the Security Council authorized the
use of force for peace enforcement25.
Also, for this record stays, as Col.
Doyle has noted, that “between 1945 and 1988, the United Nations
established thirteen peace-keeping operations, of which five were
still in the field in 1988. In the following three and a half years
since the spring of 1988, United Nations set up another thirteen
peace-keeping operations or operations similar to peace-keeping”26.
The misgivings of some of the United
Nations members, as highlighted by Goulding (1992), especially the
Non-Aligned ones, are connected with the perception of the Security
Council as not serving the United Nations Organization as a whole,
but being “highjacked” by the United States and its allies. The
criticism also points to the fact that the Security Council
authorized something, and lost control over the way in which it was
implemented. The turning point, though, was when the legislative
organs of the United Nations, the Security Council and the General
Assembly, involved the organization in the internal affairs of the
member states. In that year, the General Assembly asked the
Secretariat General to mount field operations to monitor elections in
two independent states, Nicaragua and Haiti. In the case of Haiti,
there was a straightforward internal election, and the argument made
by the Secretariat General – that if the election in Haiti did not
go well, there would be consequences for peace and security in the
Caribbean region – was not accepted. However, the provisional
president of Haiti asked the United Nations to verify the election,
and this triggered a controversy in the General Assembly about
whether it was right that the United Nations should involve itself in
an internal matter of this kind. Some member states thought that
would be a bad precedent. But still, good or bad, the precedent was
created, for the General Assembly unanimously agreed to the plan.
What happened in Haiti following the election deepened the
controversy, adding a new dimension: if the United Nations gives its
seal of approval to an election or a referendum, does that create
some kind of obligation for the United Nations to protect or
guarantee the results, so that they are not subsequently overturned
by undemocratic means?
If the conflicts of the next millennium
will be solely internal – as some seem to envisage – then Article
2(7) of the UN Charter would be outdated, since it would prevent the
United Nations from dealing with this new type of war. This line of
thought was sustained by growing international interdependency, which
triggers the concern not only for the mutual influence in the
economic field, but also in that of human values. Whether it is
justified in this way, or in the familiar one, like: “the refugees
drive westwards puts pressure on West European economies and creates
dangerous political instability in Germany, whereas a conflict
between the Albanians and the Serbs could draw Turkey and Greece into
a wider war, threatening thus the United States economic strategic
interests in Europe” (Gelb, 1992), in the United Nations there is
still an attitude of resisting the changes. The great majority of the
United Nations member states still hold that the principle of
sovereignty should not be compromised, and the restrictions of
Article 2(7) of the Charter should be upheld to avoid sliding on a
dangerous slope.
“My own view is that it is an issue
on which we should proceed rather slowly and cautiously. It would be
dangerous to start tinkering with Article 2(7) of the Charter and
giving the United Nations a license to involve itself in the internal
affairs of the member states. At the same time, there is probably
going to be a tendency within the membership to erode the restraints
of Article 2(7) in a pragmatic way and in specific cases. This has
already happened in the field of human rights, where it is now
accepted that the member states of the United Nations do have a
legitimate interest in whether human rights are being respected by
member states” (Goulding, 1992).
It is highly relevant in this context
that the Security Council used the situation in Yugoslavia for
adopting resolutions that made real breakthroughs in the existing
normative framework of international relations:
- The UN Secretary General, Boutros Ghali, recommended to the Security Council the deployment of an infantry battalion of around 700 men in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. These forces will be deployed along the border with Albania and Serbia, by 20 February at the latest, “to control and report on any incident in the border region” that could affect the stability and “territorial integrity” of the republic. When the Security Council ratifies it, this would be the first preventive deployment of UN forces27. The latest developments (June 1993) show not only that the Security Council ratified it, but that the United States is sending its own contingent there, partly as a response to criticism from its European allies, who said that the United States are quick to approve military engagement, when it has no forces deployed on the ground.
- The United Nations decided to authorize military intervention in Somalia to protect humanitarian aid. In the view of the Chairman of the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, Spanish Socialist Enrique Baron, “this operation consecrates the right of humanitarian intervention. This new principle of international law will become increasingly necessary for those who oppose it with the sacrosanct principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of a state in order to pursue a policy that is contrary to the right of the people”. Mr. Baron, therefore, saw it as a “precedent”, and felt that the “international community should consider more effective intervention in ex-Yugoslavia”28. Whereas the latest events (12 and 13 June 1993), show that the UN forces in Somalia were driven away from their initial aim, and instead of peace brought about an escalation of military activity, through not only the retaliation following the killing of the Pakistani UN peace-keepers, but also the “nervousness” of their gun-fire reply to Somali demonstrators.
- The UN Security Council formally created the International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia. “It is the first time since the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials that the international community sets up criminal procedures to try war criminals and those committing crimes against humanity. The Tribunal will sit in The Hague, and will be composed of a public prosecutor and eleven judges of different nationalities”29.
This is another crucial innovation,
since whether we agree or not in defining the Yugoslav conflict as
civil war or war between states, it is obvious that there is no such
clear cut division in the reality on the ground, and only the labels
given from the different chancelleries seem to attempt to sort it
out. Therefore, the United Nations are developing not only the
legislative framework, but also designing the means to enforce its
new asserted authority in the affairs of what had been not only a
former state, but also a former member of the organization, since the
UN General Assembly expelled in September 1992 the government of the
rump state of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on the basis of
human rights violation!
- Qualified Intervention and the European Political Co-operation
“Question: Did the Europeans have the capability to enforce a
diplomatic plan?
Answer: Europeans certainly do have enough military force to handle
this and they could have if they had acted more firmly and
consistently up front and had been more even-handed. The Europeans
were not even-handed and that undermined their credibility”30
(Scanlan, 1993).
Not only was their credibility
undermined, but also their political leverage, their capacity to
co-ordinate and to further integrate their respective foreign
policies. Indeed this had been a testing time for the EPC process and
the Community as a whole.
First, it must be clear that legally
the Community could not take action until the legal framework was
provided by the United Nations. Second, it must also be clear that
the Member States embarked illegally on a number of lone actions that
included aid to the then outlawed secessionists, and non-enforcement
of the embargo. In this context, to have different political stances
and disagree in the political fora it was only the mildest form of
divergence.
There is a set of elements like old
alliances, cultural factors, religion, ethnic composition, economic
interests, that determine the ramifications of attitudes in the EC on
other than national lines. As Wiberg (1992) stresses, Great Britain
had been allied either with the Hapsburg overlords of Croatia, in
World War I, or with the Croatian puppet state it set up with Italy,
in World War II. Serbia belonged to the French cultural sphere,
Croatia to the German one (with Italian influences in its Dalmatian
parts). Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg
and large parts of Germany and the Netherlands are Catholic, like the
Croats. Greece is the only Member State that is Orthodox, like
Serbia. Furthermore, everything else being equal, one may expect
pro-Croatian sympathies in those states that have no recent
experience, and thus little understanding of internal ethnic
conflicts, like Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Portugal.
Greater skepticism would stay with Great Britain, France, Spain,
Italy, Belgium and Greece. Germany and Italy had the greatest trading
interests in Yugoslavia, with about one fifth each of its foreign
trade, far more than any other EC country. Those interests have
primarily been in Slovenia and Croatia.
All of these factors are especially
evident when considering the positions held by the MEPs in the
debates of the European Parliament. In what concerns the EPC and the
military intervention in the Yugoslav crisis, there are three major
developments:
(a) the rendering obsolete of the
Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) as a legal
framework, and the placing of the EC actions under the cloak of the
United Nations;
(b) the rifts in the NATO framework,
which highlighted not only an American versus an European view, but
also the old pro-Alliance idiosyncrasies of some of the Member
States, as opposed to an European centered attitude of the others;
(c) the growing stature of the WEU, up
to the point of playing the part that had been written for it in the
Maastricht Treaty.
Such developments can be traced in the
following events:
(a) The European Council in Luxembourg
took steps regarding Yugoslavia in the context of the new emergency
mechanism set up by the CSCE, while Italy (and Austria) set off the
emergency proceedings for the CSCE, following the unilateral
declarations of independence of Slovenia and Croatia, and the
subsequent “unusual military activity” in Yugoslavia31.
But, the procedure did not go further than the first step, which was
the obligation of the Yugoslav government to inform Rome,
respectively Vienna, of the situation on its territory within 48
hours, a thing that the Yugoslav government did. The next step would
have meant that Italy and Austria reserved the right to set off the
second stage of the mechanism, which was convening a meeting of the
35 CSCE countries on this matter. But what would have been the
outcome of such a gathering, since in the spirit of the CSCE is
enshrined the respect for state sovereignty, and therefore Yugoslavia
would have been able to use it?!
While the EC has lost the leading role
in the play, it still can get an Oscar for best supporting role, for
its co-chairmanship with the United Nations, not only in designing,
but also in implementing the new principles for international order
in the Yugoslav case.
(b) The sharpest disagreement surfacing
in the EPC process, and the most recent one (May 1993), is a
consequence of several interwoven occurrences: (1) the UN Security
Council adopted unanimously Resolution 824 that declared five towns
in Bosnia Herzegovina as “safe areas”, and called for the
withdrawal of all Serb units from these areas. The Security Council
announced that should the resolution not be respected, it was
prepared to envisage the immediate adoption of “all extra measures”
that could be necessary32;
(2) the Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance-Owen Plan for the partition
of Bosnia Herzegovina into ten regions, on which occasion the Twelve
adopted a statement reaffirming “their total support for the
plan”33;
(3) but the spark was given by the launching of an alternative plan34
to the Vance-Owen's, by the Foreign Ministers of USA, Russia, Great
Britain, France and Spain meeting in Washington on 22 May 1993 (all
being members of the Security Council). The problem was that neither
of the participating Member States considered prior consultations
with the other Community members. The clumsiness in the way this plan
was designed and sold was furthermore highlighted by the fact that
the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, welcomed the plan as more
realistic, while the Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegovic, denounced
it as an attempt of the international community to create “camps”
for the Muslims, and thus not solve the conflict in Bosnia
Herzegovina!35
The difference of opinions among the EC Members was again obvious,
Germany stepping on the band-wagon and expressing its support for the
establishment of safe heavens in Bosnia, as recommended by the
Washington Action Plan (which Chancellor Helmut Kohl criticized
previously)36.
The same approach regarding the “double standards” the Member
States have, when they are also members of the Security Council, was
triggered by Great Britain's vote in New York, in favor of a recourse
to force, but having added that “on the ground, we will not be
there”37.
(c) Finally, the most important
achievement for the EPC during the Yugoslav conflict was the status
the WEU received. Since July 1992, WEU ships and aircraft have been
conducting, at first embargo monitoring, and subsequently embargo
enforcement operations in the Adriatic, in close co-ordination with
NATO. After the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 820,
the two military organizations discussed on a continuous basis ways
of increasing the effectiveness of these embargo enforcement
operations38.
So much so, that the Secretary General of WEU, Willem van Eekelen,
assessed that “relations between WEU and NATO are more developed
than with the EC”39.
The appropriateness of lifting the
embargo on the delivery of arms to the Bosnian Muslims (an idea
favored by the Americans, to the discomfort of the Europeans)
remained a point in dispute at the WEU Council of Ministers (Foreign
and Defense ministers) held in Rome, on 18 May 1993. But again
Germany showed itself to be the driving force, which moves from
within the EPC process towards a further and deeper endorsement of
the “new trend” in international relations, when insisting on
considering the possibility of lifting the arms embargo40.
The role the WEU can play in
co-operation with the EC in situations of crisis had been understood
like never before when the WEU Secretary General, Willem van Eekelen,
told the WEU Assembly that in the coming months there is the need for
defining the goals of the European construction in the areas of
defense and security for, in his view, the concept of defense is
changing, “because we will now be faced with protecting interests
that are broader than the national ones”. And he further cited the
situation in Somalia, as “particularly interesting”, because this
is the “first time that the United Nations seems prepared to
intervene in order to impose peace”41.
Therefore, the developments concerning
the non-intervention norm that took place during the Yugoslav crisis
show that while the UN Security Council is “preparing the ground”
both in legal terms and in actions, the EC is following closely,
re-enforcing these new trends with its own set of legal and practical
measures. No wonder for this convergence, since the 180 degrees turn
in the USSR's (and later Russia's) policy made for the UN Security
Council to be dominated by its five permanent members, and the group
of permanent members of the UN Security Council to be dominated by
Western values. In the bipolar world we parted with, the intervention
for “promoting the democratic values” of one system was opposed
with the intervention in the name of the other system's values. It
will be naive to think that the new emerging principle is to be
applied world-wide, proving thus to be disruptive for the
international order as a states system. For the time being, the
intervention on humanitarian grounds is to function only outside the
Western World, and has no countering principle or political powers to
oppose it.
Conclusion
The present essay was an attempt at
raising issues for the future, by looking through the door opened by
the Yugoslav crisis, This was not a very easy task. It is impossible
to not have preconceptions – as culture determines our mind sets.
But still, we should be aware of them for the purpose of a non-biased
analysis. Bearing that in mind, I would argue first that we should
avoid double standards about the meaning of principles of
international law; secondly, that we should be more cautious when
endorsing the new developments in this field. Thirdly, in spite of
all misgivings regarding the shift in the international paradigm,
highlighted by the Yugoslav crisis, for the European Community, and
especially for the European Political Co-operation, it was the best
opportunity to forge the envisaged mechanisms with a view to
Political Union, and the best catalysis. Before coming to a detailed
explanation as to the content of these three findings, a brief
summary of the previous three chapters seems appropriate.
In Chapter One, the focus was on
the principle of self-determination regarding its historical
development, which now faces a new turn. It looks quite likely that
self-determination is not anymore to be applied in an inter-locking
relation with the other relevant principles of international
relations, that laid the foundations of the world states' system
after World War II, but its sole superiority is emphasized. Its
theoretical soundness can be easily challenged, since on the one hand
the definition of what nation, national minority, ethnic minority is
is still waiting for coherence, and on the other hand the “new
principle” is applied not to peoples, but to territories (case in
point: the former administrative units of federal Yugoslavia). The
European Community played an active role in this, through the
opinions given by the Arbitration Commission chaired by Robert
Badinter, which ruled that Yugoslavia was in the process of
dissolution (July 1992).
In Chapter Two, state formation
and recognition was examined, at first from a historical point of
view, and finally from the perspective of new developments in the
principles, as highlighted by the Yugoslav case. The main point to be
made here is that Germany had the leading role in recognizing the new
entities, disregarding the standards on human rights protection it
settled itself. The awkward moment of Germany's lone recognition of
the breakaway republics was seen as forcing the hand of the other
Member States. Nevertheless, it worked, and as a consequence the
international practice has a precedent not easy to deal with in the
future.
Chapter Three deals with the
problem of humanitarian intervention as seen, again, from both a
historical perspective and in term of current developments. As it is
now enshrined in pieces of UN legislation and followed closely by the
practice on the ground, the right to transcend the borders and the
realm of domestic affairs of a state, on humanitarian grounds, is
seen as potentially dangerous for the world system. However, this
potentiality will not develop for the system as a whole, as long as
the privileged Club of the Western World will try to impose it
outside its borders. The perils will arise if and when the norm comes
closer home. Yugoslavia is not close enough from this point of view!
Therefore the norm is seen as only another way to assert strategic
interests outside the physical borders of the states who are using it
as a new fundamental norm in the international relations.
* * *
The idea of avoiding the double
standards when interpreting the principles of international relations
refers to the need to apply rules that are founded on moral grounds
in a way consistent with that morality. In other words, to not devise
a system in which some are “more equal” than the others. If the
foundation is unsound, there will be little room left for its
collective endorsement. As Marrack Goulding, the UN
Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, pointed out:
“the United Nations is going to become an effective system of
collective security only if all members of the United Nations feel
that the system belongs to them, and they belong to it” (Goulding,
1992: 6).
Because of the Gulf War, but also of
the Yugoslav crisis, especially the Third World and Non-Aligned
member states have all the reasons to feel alienated from the United
Nations Organization, and especially from the policies affirmed by
the UN Security Council.
Speaking for cautiousness in endorsing
the new understanding of these principles was triggered by the
following: in spite of its glamor, the trend of thought that pretends
to value above all the human being, is potentially dangerous for the
world system as a whole, exactly how in the totalitarian regimes the
praising of the state above the human being was potentially dangerous
for the latter. This is not to say that the world of states will live
now in is the best possible world. It means only that it is there, it
exists, and that the balance should be struck so as to accommodate
the fundamental aspiration of people to affirm their individuality
with their fundamental need to live in a structured society.
Challenging it could bring about a better world … or not. Would
that world be led by a UN government?! Would it be a world of duchies
and counties?! Does the future lie in regional organizations?! Who
knows? What we can know is that if it were for the new principles to
really be implemented on a world scale, than the whole system will be
dismantled, and maybe it will not be appropriate anymore to speak of
international relations, since they will not exist on such a level
anymore.
The kind of normative-wishful thinking
that aims at making us take the bitter pill is perfectly illustrated
in the comments of James Kurth on the latest book by Paul Kennedy,
“Preparing for the Twenty-First Century”. The reviewer states
that Kennedy “may be wrong that the great transnational trends of
our day will bring about a decline in the power of almost every
nation state and in the quality of life of almost every human being;
but to prove him wrong may require great conflicts and great
catastrophes that are as unanticipated and unimaginable now as were
the conflicts and catastrophes of the 20th Century to
Halford Mackinder and his contemporaries” (Kurth, 1993). So, we get
somehow to “know” that the world opposed the “natural”
international trends that could not be welcomed (Germany's
ascendancy), with two bloody World Wars. If it did not, it would have
been bad. As it was, it was even worse. Conclusion: do not oppose the
“natural” developments, no matter how uncomfortable they seem.
The only small detail to be settled is how can we know beforehand
which is the “natural” trend?!
What is likely to happen, though, it is
not the dreaded dismantling of the world system as a states' system.
Since I do not believe that the new standards will be valid for any
state, and in any circumstances, but exactly as the new doctrine
envisages, “on a case by case basis”, I take it that they will
function only through a “pragmatic approach”, to reach the aims
of what one can simply stick on the label “realpolitik".
As Joxe (1993) said, “one can only
see with one's own eyes, in the color of the helmets and of the tanks
of the United Nations expeditions, the symbolic definition of two
types of mandates: a United Nations empire (that is United Nations
expeditions sustained by the United States), and an American empire
(that is United States expeditions sustained by the United Nations)”.
Sometimes, one starts wondering if the distinction is not only
academic, and we speak actually of only one power who sees its
capacities expanded by the endorsement provided for its deeds by the
United Nations. This is all the more obvious since the model of
policing the world has shifted from peace-keeping to
peace-enforcement, with no resemblance at all with the more
constructive models proposed.
For instance Ryan (1990:15) speaks of
conflict resolution made up of peace-keeping (aimed at the violent
behavior of warriors), peace-making (aimed at the attempts by
decision makers to resolve conflicting interests), and peace-building
(aimed at the attitudes and socioeconomic circumstances of ordinary
people); that is not in sight either in Somalia, or in Yugoslavia.
Coming to the third point I found
important to emphasize – I mean the overall positive evolution
inside the European Community – I would justify it as follows:
- In spite of the inner conflicts obvious in the EPC process, when it came to the recognition of new Yugoslav entities, in the case of military involvement (be that peace-keeping, deployment of troops, or peace-enforcement), the attitudes within the Community converged increasingly. This was partly due to the cloak provided by the United Nations, which gave a new impetus to the trends favoring the engagement in one country's affairs on humanitarian grounds, which were already underway in the international organization. (Here, the American “haste” met the German one, lastly illustrated by the approval the Germans gave to the idea of lifting the arms embargo to the Bosnian Muslims – an idea cherished by the American Administration42.) At this point, the question was not anymore to recognize the seceding parts, but to make these recognitions last through military action.
- And now I come to the other meaningful fact: the WEU was reinforced as a third pillar of the Political Union yet to come. In spite of the apprehensions expressed by some of its members (Belgian Defense minister, Mr. Coeme), that the WEU should not become “the policeman of Europe”43, in the end it turned out that “the situation on the ground” asked for ever stronger military presence. The WEU followed closely the change in the stances on military presence taken by the European Community, and moved swiftly from non-interference to advocating it. As long as “in the understanding of the Community and its Member States (was) that no military intervention is contemplated”44, the Council of the WEU “meeting to discuss the possibility to send forces to protect the European observers in Yugoslavia, did not reach a decision to send such troops”45. When the EC Council President, Niels Helveg Petersen, stated that “we exclude no further steps, including military ones”46, the WEU Secretary General, Willem van Eekelen, stated that would the Vance-Owen Plan be rejected, “the pressure on Serbia would have to be mounted by stepping up the embargo, and perhaps by military means as well”47.
The last WEU Council of Ministers on
which documents were available was held in Rome on 18 May 1993. A
communique “reaffirms the commitment to developing the WEU both as
defense component of the European Union and European pillar of the
Atlantic Alliance, and shows that the WEU is prepared to implement
measures to prevent conflicts and manage crises (including
peace-keeping operations) on a case by case basis”48.
The new assertiveness of the military
organization is even more evident in the most recent stances taken by
its Secretary General, who was complaining at a meeting in Brussels
with EP's Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament that the “UN
views former Yugoslavia too much as a humanitarian problem, while the
real question is how to use force49
in international relations”50.
At the end of the day, I think the
important thing to happen would be to challenge first our moral
soundness, our intellectual premises, our capacities of analysis
before imposing our findings on others. To this end I only propose
the findings of this essay to my readers' assessment, still wondering
if I have not asked for the wrong thing in the previous sentence, for
no system, and no human being for that matter, can challenge its/his
very foundations without the danger of disintegrating itself/himself.
The only lesson taught by history that I feel compelled to remind
here is that revolutions never start from within.
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1It
should be stressed that in the Anglo-Saxon tradition the view is
held that nationalism is an undemocratic and illiberal movement that
promotes disruption and revolution, and that it will never be an
embodiment of law, morality, and tradition on which order and
security are built (Dunn, 1987: 8). Whereas East Europeans obtained
their modern notion of nationalism in defiance of the state and its
policies. In such conditions, East European nationalism was pushed
by nationalists who were actively opposed to the state. The
distinction between citizenship and nationality is a major feature
of East European life, which unfortunately is often blurred to
Westerners who, for example, refer to all the peoples of Soviet
Union as “Soviets” or “Russians” (Dunn, 1987: 10).
2Maybe
it is worth knowing that at the time of the drafting of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948, not legally binding on
states), the Commission of Human Rights decided to omit all
references to minorities from the Universal Declaration, in spite of
the support for such a clause given by the Lebanese, Soviet and
Yugoslavian delegates. When the draft declaration reached the Third
Committee of the General Assembly, the Soviet, Yugoslav and Danish
delegates attempted to re-insert a minority rights clause, but they
were not successful. The US and Australian delegates thought such a
clause will inhibit assimilation, and the French and certain Latin
American states argued that it would increase instability withing
states (Ryan, 1990: 165), However, years later, the Human Rights
Commission has established a working group to study a Yugoslav draft
on the rights of minorities. It is interesting to note that one of
the first acts of the Commission was to alter the Yugoslav emphasis
on minority groups per se to the rights of
persons belonging to national, ethnic, religious and
linguistic minorities. Even though this work began in 1978, it has
not yet completed its work, and it is unlikely to do so in the near
future (Ryan, 1990: 167).
3my
explanatory note
4The
Arbitration Commission was set by the Conference in The Hague on
Yugoslavia, organized by the European Community. Robert Badinter was
its chairman. The Commission was supposed to consist of three
Community judges and two Yugoslav ones, but ended up with all its
members being from the Community, since the Yugoslavs could not
agree on the two they were to name. Finally, the Commission was
composed of five European Presidents of Constitutional Courts,
responsible for examining the list of disputes submitted by the
different Yugoslav parties.
5Agence
Europe, no. 5636, 23/24 December 1991, p. 3
6Agence
Europe, no. 5425, 6 February 1991
7Agence
Europe, no. 5523, 29 June 1991, p.3
8Agence
Europe, no. 5586, 11 October 1991, p.4
9Agence
Europe, no. 5425, 6 February 1991
10my
emphasis. A possibility on which nobody would have ever dreamed
before, but which now surfaces in political documents as the normal
thing to happen.
11Agence
Europe, no. 5631, 16/17 December 1991, p.3
12Agence
Europe, no. 5632, 18 December 1991, p.3
13Hans-Dietrich
Genscher in an interview with “Deutschlandfunk”, on the eve of
the meeting of the Twelve. Agence Europe, no. 5631, 16/17 December
1991, p.3
14Agence
Europe, no. 5632, 18 December 1991, p.3
15my
emphasis. No less than an invitation to secede addressed to all the
“entities”.
16These
conditions, principles or “new doctrine” were: (1) the respect
of the UN Charter and the Charters of Helsinki and Paris, in the
CSCE framework (state of law, democracy, human rights); (2) the
respect of the rights of minorities and national communities; (3)
the respect of borders (which can only be modified by common
agreement via peaceful negotiations); (4) the respect of commitments
made by states in order to ensure arms control and stability; (5)
the settling of the question arising from the constitution of a new
state via agreements.
17Nuttall
complained that EPC suffered from a shortage of world crisis to
which to react (1992: p.7).
18The
decisions are binding on all states.
19Of
course, actually this did happen after 1945, but legally it was not
accepted. Or as legality was conceived up to now.
20Croatia,
and lately Bosnia Herzegovina. The Albanian time-bomb awaits the
respective recognition in order to blow up.
21And
he further notes that a relief agency can perform several of the
functions: (1) according legitimacy to the secessionists by dealing
with them directly; (2) providing moral support; (3) publicising
the secessionist case by their appeals for funds for the starving or
the displaced; (4) providing directly or indirectly the secessions
movement with medicine, food, funds, currency and perhaps even fuel
or means of communication, as a result of their inability to control
the final destination of their supplies or
the precise use of their funds; (5) serving as a cover for arms
shipments; (6) providing access to the outside world.
22Implicitly
meaning the resort to force.
23“Escorted
convoys by troops” is already a different concept from
“peace-keeping forces”. And a different military reality. Agence
Europe, no. 5794, 15 August 1992, p.1
24After
redefining the conflict in Yugoslavia as an international one.
25my
emphasis. (Goulding, 1992)
26Commandant
Colm Doyle, in a speech on “Yugoslavia: a personal view”,
delivered at the University of Limerick, 18 May 1993.
27my
emphasis. Agence Europe, no. 5876, 11 December 1992, p.7
28Agence
Europe, no 5876, 11 December 1992, p.8
29Agence
Europe, no. 5988, 27 May 1993, p.6
30John
D. Scanlan was United States' ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1985 to
1989, and foreign affairs adviser to Prime Minister Milan Panic.
31Agence
Europe, no.5523, 29 June 1991, p.3
32Agence
Europe, no.5976, 8 May 1993, p.3
33Agence
Europe, no.5983, 19 May 1993, p.3
34The
new settlement for the Bosnian conflict comprised: to adopt air
support to the Blue Helmets in the Bosnian Muslim “safe areas”,
in case of attack; to strengthen the embargo; to take measures
against Croatia, should it appear the latter helps the Croats in
Bosnia against the Muslims.
35Agence
Europe, no.5986, 24/25 May 1993
36Agence
Europe, no.5992, 3 June 1993, p.4
37Agence
Europe, no.5791, 12 August 1992, p.1
38Agence
Europe, no.5985 (Annex), 22 May 1993, p.2
39On
a meeting in Brussels with the EP's Subcommittee on Security and
Disarmament. In: Agence Europe, no.5993, 4 June 1993
40Agence
Europe, no.5984, 20 May 1993, p.5
41my
emphasis. Agence Europe, no.5871, 4 December 1992, p.4
42The
opinion was expressed by the German Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, Helmut Schaffer, at the WEU Council of Ministers (Foreign
and Defense ministers), held in Rome, on 18 May 1993. In: Agence
Europe, no.5984, 20 May 1993
43Agence
Europe, no.5572, 21 September 1991
44Agence
Europe, no.5572, 21 September 1991
45Ibidem
46Agence
Europe, no.5975, 7 May 1993, p.4
47Ibidem
48Agence
Europe, no.5984, 20 May 1993, p.5
49Maybe
it is worth noting the opinion of the International Institute of
Strategic Studies (IISS), which in “Strategic Survey 1992-1993”
suggests that “there are limits and alternatives to intervention
by force”, and although the horrified emotion caused by the sights
of former Yugoslavia is comprehensible, it is “questionable” if
governments can afford to base their policies on such emotions.
Furthermore, the IISS affirms that “a better case can be made for
intervening in Burma than in Bosnia Herzegovina” because such an
intervention “would have a clear aim, a finite end, and the
support of the majority of the people”. The report adds, however,
that this will not be undertaken because the media has not focused
on the oppression of the Burmese people by a corrupt military
leadership. In: Agence Europe, no.5984, 20 May 1993, p.6
50Agence
Europe, no.5993, 4 June 1993, p.4
